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THE FOUNDATIONS OF § 1983
JURISPRUDENCE: A LOOK FROM
THE CONCEPT OF LAW
Timothy L Oppelt*
ABSTRACT
This article uses the theories of H.L.A. Hart to provide an inter-
pretive framework for a vital civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Any interpretation of § 1983 requires some sense of the fundamental
nature of law and the ability to identify legal rules. Specifically, this
article examines the "under color of' language of § 1983 and the stat-
ute's application to municipalities. It is possible that these areas
remain partially in flux or undeveloped because the Court lacks an in-
terpretation of the statute that accounts for how rules can confer
power, create artificial persons, delegate the ability to act with the
power of the state, and cause others to believe that actions are occur-
ring under state sanction.
Hart's inclusive legal positivism can provide a comprehensive
approach to identifying legal rules, and thus, also provides a way to
interpret laws that call for identification of other laws. Additionally,
Hart's concept of the internal point of view provides a way to interpret
the "under color of' language of § 1983 that better differentiates that
language from state action. Thus, Hart's The Concept of Law is a per-
fect launching point for the application of the philosophy of law to
problems of identification such as those found in §1983 jurisprudence.
By way of introduction, the first several sections of this article present
the history behind Hart's theories and a basic overview of Hart. The
later sections of the article discuss the Supreme Court's rulings on
"under color of' and municipal liability and possible explanations and
expansions on those rulings through inclusive legal positivism.
* J.D. Loyola Law School; B.A. Emory University; Associate at Styskal, Wiese &
Melchione in Glendale, California. Mr. Oppelt would like to thank Robin Kar, Alan
Heinrich, Emily Madueno, S. Amy Spencer, Sommer Issaq, John Nockleby, Tyler Duck-
worth, Sande Buhai, and Theodore Seto for their assistance, inspiration, and support during
the writing and editing of this article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 1983 jurisprudence is famously convoluted. The statute
itself, the foundation for a tort for violations of federal rights, reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any state or territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.'
Much like the Constitution itself, this statute is broad, sweeping, and
not entirely transparent, despite its use of general and commonly un-
derstood words. In the slow progression of § 1983 jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court has been cautious in its expansions of the various doc-
trines used in its interpretation. This article is an attempt to
reinterpret and clarify two doctrines based in the wording of the stat-
ute by looking to the philosophy of law, specifically H.L.A. Hart's
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
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account in The Concept of Law.2 There, Hart sets out a way to identify
law as such, and to distinguish legal rules from moral or cultural rules.
The resulting theory distinguishes two general types of legal rules, and
sets out a theory of how citizens and officials relate to the law and take
it as creating obligations.
Purely as a historical matter, Oxford University Press first pub-
lished The Concept of Law in 1961, 3 the same year that the Supreme
Court decided Monroe v. Pape.4 As a result, Hart's theory was practi-
cally unavailable to the Supreme Court at the time, and other
jurisprudential theories lacked the nuances that might have provided
a base on which to rest § 1983. Even without this contemporaneous-
ness, it is unlikely the Court would have related Hart's work to
concrete problems of statutory interpretation. As noted in a prominent
review of The Concept of Law, "[It] is a book of its time. The book's
language, examples, and method rest in England and, more specifi-
cally, Oxford of the fifties."5 The examples and theory are largely
about British law, the Queen, and Parliament. In a very few cases, the
United States is used as an example; however, these examples are not
nuanced examinations, but rather macro-pictures used to illustrate
general points. Thus, it is perfectly understandable that the Court
would not yet have examined their method and reasoning in light of
Hart's theory, even if it were in the regular practice of citing legal
philosophy.
Any interpretation of § 1983 requires some sense of the funda-
mental nature of law. The tests in the area examined in this article,
the "under color of' language of § 1983, and the statute's application to
municipalities, remain partially in flux or undeveloped, possibly be-
cause the Court lacks an interpretation of the statute that accounts for
how rules can confer power, create artificial persons, delegate the abil-
ity to act with the power of the state, and cause others to believe that
actions are occurring under state sanction. Use of Hart's theory may
provide a foundation for the inner workings of § 1983 by more effec-
tively identifying and defining "law." This use may thus provide a path
forward into the gray areas that remain in the doctrines discussed in
this article. As the later parts of this article show, it may not be possi-
2. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Peter Cane et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994) (1961).
3. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
4. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Monroe was the advent of modern § 1983
jurisprudence, as it reinterpreted the statute to apply to actions that were not specifically
authorized by state law. See id.
5. Leslie Green, The Concept of Law Revisited, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1687, 1688 (1996)
(book review).
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ble to avoid at least some degree of the uncertainty that has been
characteristic of the Court's analysis up to now; however, this fact does
not decrease the value that Hart's theory has in clarifying and system-
atizing § 1983 jurisprudence.
Part II of this article provides some background on the develop-
ment of Hart's ideas in The Concept of Law. Part III then explains
Hart's theory, incorporating some recent elaboration. As I do not pur-
port to prove that Hart's original conception of his theory is more
correct, or a better explanation for § 1983, than any of the criticisms of
or elaborations on his theory, I do not include significant discussion of
those theories here. This article is not a critique of the definition of
law, nor is it a thorough examination of the Supreme Court's reasoning
in light of multiple theories. This article may merely be a shot across
the bow of the Court's method and reasoning, one suggestion of a way
to systematically move forward with this statute.
Over all, Part IV of this article explains the current state of
§ 1983 jurisprudence on these issues and compares it to applicable as-
pects of Hart's theory. When laying the foundations for modern use of
§ 1983 in Monroe v. Pape,6 Justice Douglas based his definition of
"under color of' on legislative history and previous cases. "Misuse of
power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because
the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action
taken 'under color of state law."7 Part IV-A discusses this "under color
of' language. Justice Brennan, in Monell v. Department of Social Ser-
vices,8 stated that "municipalities through their official acts could,
equally with natural persons, create the harms intended to be reme-
died by §1," 9 but that "a municipality cannot be held liable solely
because it employs a tortfeasor."10 Part IV-B ventures into the expan-
sion of the term "person" to include municipalities and the cases in
which individual action can be taken to be action for the larger unit.
This article will not, however, venture into the morass of the Eleventh
Amendment and the concept of States as persons. Grounding the con-
cept of state sovereign immunity in a theoretical framework is a much
larger, and completely separate, project. Later expansions of this work
could well include examinations of the state action doctrine in Four-
teenth Amendment jurisprudence, absolute and qualified immunities
6. Monroe, 365 U.S. 167.
7. Id. (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941)).
8. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
9. Id. at 685-86.
10. Id. at 691.
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under § 1983 and Bivens actions, and sovereign immunity, as well as
any other doctrine that requires an identification of law.
In the end, while Hart's theory provides some theoretical frame-
work for § 1983, it does not provide a final answer to every definitional
or interpretive problem. However, in both areas examined here, clari-
fication on the concept of law provides some clarification and
systemization of the doctrines that require an identification of the law.
Clarification of how citizens and officials act within and react to the
law provides a way to move forward with an interpretation of the lan-
guage, aims, and results of this immensely important but troublesome
statute.
II. THE CONCEPT OF LAW AS A RESPONSE TO EARLIER THEORIES
In order to understand Hart's theory, it is important to place it
in context within the greater philosophy of law dialectic. Previous the-
ories fell largely into two camps: the early legal positivists and the
natural law theorists. Each of these theories is an attempt to answer
the question, "What is law?" Parts A and B below will give a general
account of early natural law theory and early positivism, respectively.
These Parts show the nature of the philosophy of law debate that
spawned Hart's inclusive legal positivism. Hart's work, as described in
Part C and Part III below, introduces the concept of inclusive legal pos-
itivism as a response to and elaboration on these earlier theories.
A. Natural Law Theory: A Brief Historical Account
Natural law theory describes law as mirroring or merely being a
reference to morality.11 From Aristotle on, natural law theory has held
a strong place in Western culture. 12 Blackstone summarized the doc-
trine as:
This law of nature being coeval with mankind and dictated by God
himself is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding
over the whole globe, in all countries at all times. No human laws
are of any validity if contrary to this, and such of them as are valid
11. Hart's statement of the basic premise of natural law theory is "that between law
and morality there is a connection which is in some sense necessary." HART, supra note 2, at
155.
12. Natural law theorists in the history of Western philosophy have included Aristotle
in the classical era, Aquinas in the Medieval era, all the way through Dworkin and some
contemporary thinkers. See John Finnis, Natural Law Theories, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edwin N. Zalta et al. eds., 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/natural-law-theories/.
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derive their force and all their authority, mediately or immediately,
from this original.1
3
Another, more general statement of the basic principle guiding natural
law theory is that "Unjust laws are not laws." 14 In many cases, natural
law theory purports to simultaneously answer the questions "What is
law?" and "What laws should we have?"
The rise of the natural sciences in Western culture brought
about one of the major problems for natural law theory: conflict with
the naturalistic worldview. The naturalistic worldview purports to
limit its ideas about the world to what can be observed and tested. 15
When we say that there is some "law," can we point to the thing that
we are calling law? Under natural law theory, it is difficult to point to
law in a secular way. It makes a certain amount of sense, if one is
goirig to be positing the existence of something, to base that existence
on some identifiable properties in the world.
Another significant problem with natural law theory is that it
has a hard time accounting for the clearly non-moral aspects of the
law.16 For example, the decision of whether one will drive on the left or
right side of the road is not a moral one. The content of this purely
administrative aspect does not seem to be just or unjust, moral or im-
moral. This example leads to a critique of any one-to-one link between
law and morality: "there exists at least one conceivable rule of recogni-
tion (and therefore possible legal system) that does not specify as a
moral principle among the truth conditions for any proposition of
law."'17 These objections to natural law theory lead directly to the de-
velopment of legal positivism.
B. Positive Law Theory Before Hart
"Positivism denies what natural law theory asserts, namely, a
necessary connection between law and morality."18 John Austin popu-
13. J.L. Mackie, The Third Theory of Law, in PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS (1977),
reprinted in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 167, 167 (Joel Feinberg & Jules Coleman eds., 6th ed.
2000) (quoting JULIUS STONE, THE PROVIDENCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 227 (1946)).
14. "Lex iniusta non est lex." See HART, supra note 2, at 156.
15. See generally Brian Leiter, Naturalism in Legal Philosophy, in STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 12, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-
naturalism/ (explaining current naturalistic theory).
16. Cf., e.g., Natural Law Theories, supra note 12, § 1.5 (explaining how some natural
law theorists deal with this problem).
17. See Jules Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra
note 13, at 95, 96.
18. Id. Modem positivists now draw the distinction differently, largely due to Hart's
influence. See Leslie Green, Legal Positivism § 4.2, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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larized the positivism movement, which attempts to separate moral
rules and "positive law." This separation is important to ground the
study of law in the naturalistic worldview. In order to understand law
in the world, one must be able to find the thing to which "law" refers.
The early positivists found their laws in commands given by a sover-
eign. 19 Hart describes these theories as basing law on commands by a
sort of gunman writ large.
20
These theories generally map well onto criminal law but have
trouble explaining aspects of law such as those laws delegating power,
whether it is the power to create contracts or the power of legislatures
and administrative agencies to make laws. This is a general problem
with seeing laws as orders backed by threats. Additionally, all laws
cannot be purely vertical relationships between sovereign and sub-
ject.21 "[S]uch a conception of law cannot explain the variety of forms
of law, nor how sovereigns can be bound by their own rules, nor how
law survives the death of the commander."22 Early positivism's trou-
bles dealing with the content of laws, their range of application, and
their mode of origin provide Hart with the ammunition with which he
replaces that more-simplistic model.
23
C. Hart's Responses
Both natural law theory and early positivism contained sub-
stantial problems in their definitions of law. Natural law theory had
problems with multiplicity of systems, while positive law theory had
problems with complexity of systems. Hart's theory responds to each.
In response to early positivism, Hart disposes of the need to root
sovereignty in a single body to allow for orders to be coming from the
sovereign, 24 though he still retains the positivist naturalistic
worldview in his description of legal systems. In response to natural
law theory, Hart admits that there are definite connections between
PHILOSOPHY (Edwin N. Zalta et al. eds., 2003), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-
positivism/.
19. Green, supra note 5, at 1693 (citing THOMAS HOBBES, LEvIATHAN 311-35 (C.B.
Macpherson ed., 1968); JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970);
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (Wilfred E. Rumble ed.,
1995)).
20. HART, supra note 2, at 22-24.
21. Id. ch. IV, at 50.
22. Green, supra note 5, at 1693 (citing HART, supra note 2, at 26-78).
23. HART, supra note 2, at 27.
24. Id. chs. IV, VI, VII.
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law and morality. 25 However, these connections are not "necessary,"
as defined by most natural law theories. 26 He points out six forms of
connection between law and morality: officials' use of morality in deci-
sion making and in exercise of power; the influence of morality on law;
in use of morality in the interpretation of law; use of morality in the
criticism of law; law's relation to justice; and the use of moral language
in assessing legal validity.2 7 A separation of the concepts of law and
morality "enables us to see the complexity and variety of these sepa-
rate issues; whereas a narrow concept of law which denies legal
validity to iniquitous rules may blind us to them."
28
Hart's responses to early positivism and natural law theory end
up with his advent of the idea that is now developed as inclusive legal
positivism. The theory is based on two constraints: adoption of a natu-
ralistic worldview; and consistency and accuracy within the theory as
to the perspectives of citizens and the officials participating in the legal
system.29 One can find legal validity in the world, and within a legal
system officials and citizens may regard law as valid and having moti-
vating force.
According to Hart, law is a historical phenomenon and a social
construction: It depends on what has been said and done previously,
and it does not exist absent human action and specific developments in
human society.30 He specifically roots his arguments in the fact that
societies can exist with rules that do not amount to law - instead these
societies rely on "custom." 3 1 The rules in these simple societies, how-
ever, are "static, inefficient, and fraught with uncertainty."32 In order
to account for change in rules, for rules that are non-moral, and for
rules that do not seem to follow the "gunman writ large" model, Hart
created a more complex picture of what law is. Part III below explains
the specifics of that theory in greater detail.
It should be noted that any legal analysis using Hart's theory
must in some sense be an identification analysis. As it is a theory of
25. Id. at 193-200.
26. See id. at 202.
27. Id. at 202-10.
28. Id. at 211.
29. Robin Bradley Kar, Hart's Response to Exclusive Legal Positivism, 95 GEo. L. REV.
393, 394-96 (2007).
30. Green, supra note 5, at 1689-92; HART, supra note 2, at 91-94.
31. HART, supra note 2, at 91-94. Hart rejects the term "custom" because "it often
implies that the customary rules are very old and supported with less social pressure than
other rules." Id. at 91. The rules in such a society would "resemble our own rules of
etiquette." Id. at 92.
32. Green, supra note 5, at 1698; see HART, supra note 2, at 92-94.
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the law, use of Hart's theory would not be effective in a situation where
the goal was to supply definitions for terms other than terms entwined
in the definition of law. As it is not a natural law theory or a theory of
justice, Hart's theory as an analytical tool would also not be effective in
a normative realm - an analysis attempting to answer the question of
what the law on a given subject should be. Rather, Hart's theory pro-
vides immense assistance any time the analysis requires a
determination of what law is and what properties it has. As discussed
in Part IV below, § 1983 analysis requires identification of various
state rules and determination of the status of various actions that
might have the appearance of law. As such, § 1983 may be uniquely
suited to a Hartian framework. 33
III. SECONDARY RULES AND THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY
Hart combines two types of rules to create his account of the
nature of law: primary rules and secondary rules.34 Primary rules are
similar to the early positivists' accounts of "the gunman writ large."
They are rules that directly impose duties upon individuals via threat
of sanctions.3 5 The most basic example of a set of primary rules is
criminal law: orders by the sovereign to refrain from certain actions
create obligations to so refrain. However, Hart's notion of primary
rules does not necessarily require a sovereign in the sense meant by
the early positivists.
36
Secondary rules are generally power-conferring, rather than
duty-imposing.37 Secondary rules "provide that human beings may by
doing or saying certain things introduce new rules of the primary
type."38 The aspects of and types of these rules are discussed below in
Part A.
Under Hart's conception, primary and secondary rules do not
merely provide guidelines for officials or judges.39 Common persons
33. One other area of the law that might be particularly well suited to this sort of
analysis might be the state action doctrine of constitutional law. While some of this
doctrine is touched on below, this article does not go into this doctrine in a detailed or
thorough way.
34. HART, supra note 2, at 80-81.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Id. at 81. Some critiques of Hart's distinction have centered on the duty-imposing
nature of some secondary rules, and the non-power-conferring nature of others. See K.-K.
Lee, Hart's Primary and Secondary Rules, 77 MIND 561 (1968); Jonathan Cohen, Critical
Notice, 71 MIND 395 (1962).
38. HART, supra note 2, at 81.
39. Id. at 90-91.
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take these rules as providing reasons to conform their behavior accord-
ingly, as well as grounds for others to criticize and make claims on
them.40 Hart calls this the "internal point of view. '' 41 This internal
standpoint does not merely provide answers to the questions, "What
should I do?" and "What does the law in a particular jurisdiction pro-
scribe?"4 2 It provides common persons with the ability to make claims
against others for deviation, and when taken up, it makes individual
citizens think that others may make claims for deviation against
them.43 Under this model, the law is not merely descriptive, nor is it
merely a tool for officials to mete out punishment and reward: In some
sense it provides internal psychological reasons for compliance and en-
forcement.44 The importance of and specific aspects of the internal
point of view are discussed below in Part B.
A. Secondary Rules
The secondary rules Hart describes in The Concept of Law con-
sist of three types: rules of recognition, rules of legislation/change, and
rules of adjudication. 45 These types of rules, while not exhausting the
possible types of secondary rules, are the ones Hart posits as separat-
ing law from morality and other types of rule systems. These three
types of rules respond to the troubles inherent in simpler societies that
might lack law: uncertainty, lack of change, and inefficiency. 46 Rules
of recognition enable identification of other legal rules.4 7 Rules of leg-
islation enable enactment of and modification of primary and
secondary rules.48 Rules of adjudication enable settlement of disputes
and the application of general rules to specific cases. 49 All of these
types of rules are vital to our idea of law as a system of rules and to the
functioning of legal systems. Because of the specific focus of this arti-
cle, the sections below only explain rules of legislation and rules of
recognition.
40. Id. at 82-91.
41. Id. at 89.
42. These questions are described as first and third personal questions. Kar, supra
note 29, at 425-26.
43. Kar, supra note 29, at 427-28; see HART, supra note 2, at 86-91.
44. See HART, supra note 2, at 90 ("ITihe violation of a rule is not merely a basis for the
prediction that a hostile reaction will follow but a reason for hostility.").
45. See generally HART, supra note 2.
46. Id. at 91-94.
47. Id. at 94, 100.
48. Id. at 95.
49. Id. at 96-98.
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1. Rules of Legislation
Rules of legislation 5° provide the rules by which new rules are
introduced or old rules are eliminated.5 1 They "may be very simple or
very complex; the powers conferred may be unrestricted or limited in
various ways; and the rules may, besides specifying the persons who
are to legislate, define in more or less rigid terms the procedure to be
followed in legislation."
52
Hart explains two separate types of rule-making acts, typified
by what we call legislation and precedent. 53 Both are types of use of
the rule of legislation, however, each creates rules of differing sort of
generality. Legislation creates a rule with maximal use of general lan-
guage, whereas precedent uses minimal general language. 54 The lines
between these two extremes, in practice, however, are blurred: There is
a sliding scale of types of rule creation between legislation and prece-
dent, with few real examples lying perfectly at one extreme. The
distinction is additionally blurred since both types of rule creation cre-
ate uncertainties as to what situations in which the rule applies and
how exactly the rule is to be carried out.5 5
Hart thus ascribes to the law an "open texture" - no matter
which method of creating law is used, the law will at some point be
unclear as to the extent of its application. 56 Because of the open tex-
ture of law, the necessary indeterminacy of human use of language,
and the non-finite number of facts and features of the world, Hart also
warns against attempts to forestall ambiguity. 57  "When the
unenvisaged case does arise, we confront the issues at stake and can
then settle the question by choosing between the competing interests
in a way that satisfies us."5 8 This seems to be a direct endorsement of
judicial use of moral and other policy arguments. 59
50. Hart uses instead the term "rules of change." Id. at 95.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 96.
53. Id. at 124.
54. Id. at 124.
55. Id. at 126 ("IT]here is a limit, inherent in the nature of language, to the guidance
which general language can provide.").
56. Id. at 128.
57. Id. at 128.
58. Id. at 129.
59. These policy arguments are specifically for use when the rule is unclear and when
"[i]n doing so we shall have rendered more determinate our initial aim, and shall
incidentally have settled a question as to meaning, for the purposes of this rule, of a general
word." Id. at 129.
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It is up to the legal system in question, however, to decide to
what degree it will exercise choice in the interpretation of rules, the
"application of general rules to particular cases,"60 and the amount of
flexibility available to settle new problems or change interpretations.
61
In the United States, these issues are all dealt with through stare deci-
sis and various cannons of construction. These descriptions of how
particular situations are related to the general rules, however, are
properly discussed as a part of the rules of adjudication of a legal
system.
2. Rules of Recognition
Rules of recognition are the rules by which persons examining
the law of a jurisdiction may determine what the law is.62 Rules of
recognition are found in any theory of law. 63 For" example, natural law
theory has a rule of recognition that refers directly to morality: One
can recognize laws by recognizing morality. The major difference with
Hart's rules of recognition is that they are not dependent on moral or
normative content.
For Hart, rules of recognition can contain many different crite-
ria. "[T]hese include reference to an authoritative text; to legislative
60. Id. at 129.
61. Id. at 130.
62. Jules Coleman put it well when he wrote: "Every theory about the nature or
essence of law purports to provide a standard ... for determining which of a community's
norms constitute its law. . . . Legal positivism of the sort associated with H.L.A. Hart
maintains that, in every community where law exists, there exists a standard that
determines which of the community's norms are legal ones." Coleman, supra note 17, at 95.
Other commentators have said that "Hart describes the rule of recognition as a conventional
judicial rule that identifies certain things as sources of law." Green, supra note 5, at 1706.
The discussion here, however, will treat rules of recognition not as purely judicial. Under
common understandings of the strengths of Hart's theory, Hart's own words, and the
motivations behind legal positivism,.Hart's theory also provides an account for the fact that
citizens often use the rule of recognition to have some sort of notice of the law. See HART,
supra note 2, at 100 ("Whenever ... a rule of recognition is accepted, both private persons
and officials are provided with authoritative criteria for identifying primary rules of
obligation."); Coleman, supra note 17, at 97 ("Law is knowable and ascertainable; so that,
while a person may not know the range of his moral obligations, he is aware of (or can find
out) what the law expects of him."). If the rule of recognition were only used by judges or
experts (attorneys), then Hart's theory would fall under the same weaknesses that plague
theories that support the idea that "The law is what judges will do in a certain case," e.g.
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE 1 (1986), but rather would be under the formulation of
"The law is what judges and attorneys will recognize as the law in a certain case." Hart's
clarification comes with his discussion of the internal point of view and how judges make
internal statements that do not amount to predictions of the actions of judges. See HART,
supra note 2, at 105.
63. Coleman, supra note 17, at 95.
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enactment; to customary practice; to general declarations of specified
persons; or to past judicial decisions in particular cases."64 The com-
mon thread in many of these examples, especially those familiar to the
rules of recognition in the United States, is that they are generaliza-
tions of the process of creating or changing rules. Thus, an important
aspect of rules of recognition is that they are interwoven with rules of
legislation:65 One can often recognize a law based on the method in
which it was enacted and was put into the form in which we expect
laws to appear. Note also that in modem legal systems, there is usu-
ally more than one way to make law and more than one source of law.
This necessarily makes the rule of recognition more complex.
66
No matter how complex the picture looks, distinctions between
the sources of law and specification of their relations to one another,
particularly in a Federalist system, are important. When there are
multiple sources of law, normally there are also criteria for ranking the
sources in case of possible conflict. 67 All law is not, at base, legislation
or constitutional law: There is a difference between "subordination"
and "derivation."68 While all State law may be subordinate to the Con-
stitution due to the Fourteenth Amendment, this does not mean that
all State law is in any way derived from the Constitution - quite the
opposite, in fact.
Additionally, there need not be a lack of conflict about the con-
tent under the rules of recognition: "[T]here is the possibility of conflict
between [the] authoritative applications of the rule and the general un-
derstanding of what the rule plainly requires according to its terms."
69
This means that when officials state their position on or interpretation
of rules, this can still be seen as law even if their positions clearly differ
from the commonly understood terms of the rule.
However, it is not necessarily the case that rules of recognition
are purely based on "pedigree."70 There is a conflict in Hart's writing
64. HART, supra note 2, at 100.
65. "Plainly, there will be a very close connection between the rules of change and the
rules of recognition: for where the former exists the latter will necessarily incorporate a
reference as an identifying feature of the rules, though it need not refer to all the details of
procedure involved in legislation." Id. at 96.
66. See id. at 101.
67. Id. at 101.
68. Id. at 101.
69. Id. at 102.
70. Hart's Postscript to The Concept of Law responds to Dworkin's critique of the
concept of rules of recognition: "[they] may go beyond the mode of creation or adoption of
rules and include among [their] criteria both matters of fact not properly thought of as
pedigree ... and matters not of fact but of moral value." Green, supra note 5, at 1705; see
HART, supra note 2, at 250.
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on this point. In his Postscript to The Concept of Law, Hart writes,
"[I] n some systems of law, as in the United States, the ultimate criteria
of legal validity might explicitly incorporate besides pedigree, princi-
ples of justice or substantive moral values, and these may form the
content of legal constitutional constraints."71 However, this concept,
supposedly drawn from an earlier paper, seems to have originally been
an explanation of the distinction "between the presence of an enforcea-
ble duty not to legislate in a certain way - arguably inconsistent with
supreme authority [and thus Austin's view] - and the absence of a le-
gal power to legislate in a certain way."72 Thus, even in the United
States a law may be considered a law even if it is considered invalid
under constitutional constraints.
B. The Internal Point of View
The internal point of view largely separates Hart's positivism
from others. 73 The internal point of view is generally stated as that
standpoint a person takes up when they accept rules as creating obli-
gations for themselves: "'a critical reflective attitude to certain
patterns of behavior as a common standard,' which gives rise not only
to guides ... for action but also to grounds for criticizing deviations."
74
Hart illustrates the difference between two statements: "[i]t is the law
that . . ." versus "[i]n England they recognize as law whatever the
Queen enacts."75 For Hart, taking the internal point of view and mak-
ing, internal statements about the law imply acceptance of "validity" of
the law, and with it an obligation, in that the law seems to pass the
tests provided in the rule of recognition of the system. 76 This can be
seen as a sort of "expressivism," in that statements that something is
the law are not only statements of fact about the world, but also ex-
pressions of the attitude of accepting an obligation. 77
The important implication of this attitude toward the law for
this article is that citizens see what they perceive as the law as in some
71. HART, supra note 2, at 247.
72. Green, supra note 5, at 1705.
73. The following description of the internal point of view will be largely from Hart's
own work. Recent work by Robin Kar combining elaborations on Hart and discussions of
use of moral language has created a more nuanced account of the internal point of view. See
Kar, supra note 29. This discussion will necessarily be more simplistic than Kar's account
due to the limited scope of this article.
74. Kar, supra note 29, at 407 (citing HART, supra note 2, at 57).
75. HART, supra note 2, at 102.
76. Id. at 103.
77. Id. at 82-91; Kar, supra note 29, at 396-97.
104 Vol. 2:1:91
2007 THE FOUNDATIONS OF § 1983 JURISPRUDENCE
sense obligatory. The extent and character of this obligation is debata-
ble, 78 but no matter what, under any version of inclusive legal
positivism, the perception of a law gives citizens a reason for acting in
accordance with it. Often a reason for compliance involves the notion
that other citizens or the government might validly be able to make
claims for deviations or noncompliance. The fact that law gives indi-
viduals reasons 79 for action separates law from other types of rules or
convergences in behavior.80
IV. SECTION 1983: COLOR OF LAW AND MUNICIPALITIES AS PERSONS
Section 1983 contains several basic elements: 1) a person; 2)
acting "under color of' state law; 3) depriving another of "rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. 8 1 The
statute was enacted as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20,
1871.82 The purpose of the act is stated in its title: "An Act to enforce
the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States, and for other Purposes."8 3 As a part of the basic struc-
ture of government in the United States, the Constitution - "the
supreme law of the land" - creates the initial secondary rules for the
federal government, some of which also limit the power of state govern-
ments.8 4 The federal structure of the American system allows
concurrent "laws" on the federal level and the state level. The states
may then also confer power, so that smaller political units, namely mu-
nicipal corporations, may enact "laws."
In general, a quick check is in order to ensure that the constitu-
tional structure of United States law does not run afoul of Hart's
theory. For a law to be valid in the United States, it must also be con-
stitutional.8 5 Additionally, because of the Supremacy Clause, in order
for a state law to be valid, it must not conflict with valid federal law.
8 6
Federal law could normally be considered part of any rule of recogni-
78. See Kar, supra note 29, at 408-11, 419-23.
79. And some would specify the "right kind" of reasons. E.g., Kar, supra note 29 at 398,
406, 432.
80. See HART, supra note 2, 85-86, 94.
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2007).
82. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171.
83. Id. at 171 (citing 17 Stat. 13).
84. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-V, amend. 14.
85. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) ("Certainly all those who have framed
written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of
the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of
the legislature, repugnant to the constitution is void.").
86. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 303 (2001).
105
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW
tion in any state. As discussed above, Hart specifically accounts for the
supremacy of one source of law among many in his theory,8 7 so the
Supremacy Clause generally does not conflict with the idea of rules of
recognition.
At first blush, however, this may seem to be a violation of the
naturalistic-worldview constraints on rules of recognition. This article
does not purport to analyze whether the Supreme Court's constitu-
tional analysis refers to natural law principles or moral judgments and
whether that poses a real problem for Hart.8 8 True, in § 1983 analysis,
one is examining whether there has been a constitutional violation.
This may seem to either be or require a normative analysis. 'However,
for the purposes of § 1983, the Constitution or federal law could say
anything: all that matters is whether it was violated.
Hart's theory, with its nuanced conception of the nature of legal
rules, may be able to provide a way to move forward in interpreting
this statute. Phrasing choices of interpretation in terms of Hart's the-
ory may help to clarify the doctrines involved. Over all, one might be
able to see § 1983 as a primary rule creating an obligation to follow one
part of the secondary rules of United States law: When acting, officials
must act without depriving citizens of federal rights. On the other
hand, § 1983 could be a primary rule prohibiting use of the guise of
secondary rules to cause specific types of harm: Federal rights, when
deprived by a person whom citizens recognize as having the backing of
the law, are protected by this statute. Clearly, though, the statute is a
primary rule that refers to secondary rules. To what secondary rules
does it refer and to what extent? To whom does it apply and how? The
following sections analyze these questions. Fundamentally, Hart's the-
ory assists in these analyses whenever there is a problem involving the
identification of law - whether objectively or subjectively - or action by
an individual within the law. Hart's theory does not, however, supply
standards for the initial content of the primary rule of § 1983, the defi-
nitional aspects of persons, citizens, rights, or liability.
87. See HART, supra note 2, at 106 ("But even systems like that of the United States in
which there is no such legally unlimited legislature may perfectly well contain an ultiinate
rule of recognition which provides a set of criteria of validity, one of which is supreme.").
88. Hart responds to arguments such as this one: "In some systems, as in the United
States, the ultimate criteria of legal validity explicitly incorporate principles of justice or
morality; in other systems, as in England, where there are no formal restrictions on the
competence of the supreme legislature, its legislation may yet no less scrupulously conform
to justice or substantive moral values.... No 'positivist' could deny that these are facts, or
that the stability of legal systems depends in part upon such types of correspondence with
morals." HART, supra note 2, at 204.
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A. "Under Color of" Law
For liability to attach, § 1983 requires the action that violates
constitutional rights to be "under the color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any state or territory."8 9 The meaning
of this phrase is not clear on its face: "under color of' is not a phrase
that provides explicit standards on which it should be judged. Thus,
certain interpretive choices must be made to supply meaning to the
statute. The sections below lay out the progression of the interpreta-
tion of this phrase and then demonstrate how Hart's theory can
provide a systematic way to move forward into scenarios that have not
yet been before the Supreme Court.
1. The Cases
In the seminal § 1983 case, Monroe v. Pape,90 the question was
presented whether § 1983 gave "a remedy to parties deprived of consti-
tutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his
position."91 The City of Chicago and the thirteen policemen who broke
into Monroe's home and mistreated him 92 argued that "under color of'
law "excludes acts of an official or policeman who can show no author-
ity under state law, state custom, or state usage to do what he did."93
Essentially, because the policemen violated the Constitution and broke
Illinois law, their actions could not be "law" and therefore could not
violate either the Constitution or § 1983: the statute did not cover
rogue acts.94 The Court was not convinced.95
In part, a previous holding in Home Telephone & Telegraph Co.
v. Los Angeles 96 is necessary to understand Monroe. In Home Tele-
phone, the Court ruled that what is deemed state action is broader
than action authorized by the state.97 There, as in Monroe, the action
taken - a Los Angeles City ordinance fixing utility rates98 - would
have been a violation of the state constitution as well as the federal
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2007).
90. Monroe, 365 U.S. 167.
91. Id. at 172.
92. Id. at 169.
93. Id. at 172.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 183-87.
96. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. L.A., 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
97. See id. at 283-84, 287-96.
98. See id. at 280-281.
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constitution. 9 The city argued that because the ordinance violated the
state constitution, federal relief was not available. That is, until the
highest court of the state made a determination that state law author-
ized the ordinance, the ordinance could not have been state action in
violation of the constitution. 100 The Court rejected the city's argument,
holding that the Fourteenth Amendment extends to "those who carry a
badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity,
whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it."
1°1
To carry the holding of Home Telephone forward to apply to
§ 1983 as well, Justice Douglas turned to legislative history: "There are
threads of many thoughts running through the debates. One who
reads them in their entirety sees that the present section has three
main aims." 10 2 Taking the aims he found in the debates, Justice Doug-
las wrote:
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed
was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of
prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance, or otherwise, state laws
might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of
rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.
10 3
This holding that § 1983 applies to validly passed laws as well as inva-
lid laws and actions by state actors implicates the interpretation under
Hart's theory of the statute as a primary rule to prohibit use of the
guise of secondary rules to cause specific types of harm. The City of
Chicago and the police officers in Monroe would have had the statute
apply only to valid state primary rules or actions, so that "under color
of any" law would mean "under a properly enacted and valid" law. This
would have produced the absurd result that an action could be "law"
without being "under color of' law. The Court rejected this narrowing
interpretation, so that under Monroe it does not matter whether the
action taken actually is a valid action.' 0 4
99. See id. at 280.
100. See id. at 281-82.
101. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172; see Home Telephone, 227 U.S. at 288 ("That is to say, a
state officer cannot on one hand as a means of doing a wrong forbidden by the Amendment
proceed upon the assumption of the possession of state power and at the same time, for the
purpose of avoiding the application of the Amendment, deny the power and thus accomplish
the wrong.").
102. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173. "First, it might, of course, override certain kinds of state
laws.... Second, it provided a remedy where state law was inadequate.... [T]hird... was
to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not
available in practice." Id. at 173-74.
103. Id. at 180.
104. Id. at 172-87.
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However, the holding in Monroe does not provide a generally-
applicable standard by which to decide whether an action is "under
color of' law. The police officers were municipal officials, and under
the state action doctrine in Home Telephone, they would be state ac-
tors. The question remains whether a private party may at any point
be considered acting "under color of' law, and if so, whether the "under
color of' standard is the same as the state action doctrine as it extends
to private parties. This continuing question leaves open the interpre-
tation that § 1983 could merely be a primary rule creating an
obligation to follow one part of the secondary rules of United States
law.
The Court began to answer these questions in Lugar v. Ed-
mondson Oil Co. 10 5 There, Edmondson Oil Company (Edmondson)
made use of a Virginia statute allowing for attachment of debtor prop-
erty via an ex parte proceeding.' 0 6 Thirty-four days later, a state court
ruled that Edmondson could not prove the allegations in its complaint
and released the attachment on Lugar's property.' 0 7 Lugar then sued
Edmondson under several theories, one of which was a § 1983 claim for
the deprivation of his property without due process of law.'08
Because the claim was a due process claim, the question of
whether the Fourteenth Amendment was violated had to be answered
as well as whether that violation was "under color of' law.10 9 Citing
Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks," 0 the Court clearly stated that a viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause can only be
accomplished by a state actor."' It noted that in other cases - as it did
in Lugar - it also avoided the question of whether and to what extent
"under color of' varied from state action, even in non-due-process con-
texts. 1 2 The Court did cite United States v. Price"3 for the proposition
that "'under color' of law has consistently been treated as the same
thing as the 'state action' required under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."1 4 The Court backed off from this proposition in footnote
eighteen, however:
105. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
106. See id. at 924-25.
107. See id. at 925.
108. See id. at 925.
109. Id. at 930.
110. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
111. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 930.
112. See id. at 930-32, 935 n.18.
113. 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966).
114. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 928 (quoting Price, 383 U.S. at 794 n.7).
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First, although we hold that conduct satisfying the state-action re-
quirement of the Fourteenth Amendment satisfies the statutory
requirement of action under color of state law, it does not follow
from that that all conduct that satisfies the under-color-of-state-law
requirement would satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment require-
ment of state action .... Second, although we hold in this case that
the under-color-of-state-law requirement does not add anything not
already included within the state-action requirement of the Four-
teenth Amendment, § 1983 is applicable to other constitutional
provisions and statutory provisions that contain no state-action
requirement. 115
Developments - or lack thereof - on this distinction will be discussed
later in this Part. The distinction itself, however, brings the Court
closer to one interpretation of § 1983: that it prohibits certain harms
done under the guise of state action, rather than solidifying state ac-
tion as a requirement of the statute.
Because of the due process context, the Lugar Court stated that
"[iif the challenged conduct. . . constitutes state action..., then that
conduct was also action under color of state law and will support a suit
under § 1983."116 To qualify as state action, the conduct that causes
the deprivation of a federal right must "be fairly attributable to the
State."11 7 The two prong test to determine "fair attribution" is:
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right
or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by
the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible.... Sec-
ond, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who
may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he is a
state official, because he has acted together with or has obtained
significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is other-
wise chargeable to the State.
118
These two prongs "collapse into each other" when the claim is made
against "a party whose official character is such as to lend the weight
of the State to his decisions," as occurred in Monroe." 9 They diverge
when the claim is "against a party without such apparent authority,
i.e., against a private party."
20
The first prong - the action requirement - essentially equates
to the proposition that in order for an act to be state action, the must
be some related government decision or authorization. The second
115. Id. at 935 n.18.
116. Id. at 935.
117. Id. at 937.
118. Id. at 937.
119. Id. (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172 (1961)).
120. Id. (emphasis added).
Vol. 2:1:91110
2007 THE FOUNDATIONS OF § 1983 JURISPRUDENCE 111
prong - the actor requirement - equates to the proposition that the
party must in some way be linked to the state. The Court did not de-
scribe, however, a consistent method of determining when the actor
requirement is satisfied, other than to say that "something more" is
needed. 121 To define "something more," several different tests have
been used in different contexts, including a public function test, a state
compulsion test, a nexus test, and a joint action test.122 In Lugar, the
test was met because a statute authorized the attachment procedure
and Edmondson worked with state authorities (the joint action test) to
deprive Lugar of his property.
123
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan
124
reiterated the test from Lugar, while emphasizing that "§ 1983 ex-
cludes from its reach 'merely private conduct, no matter how
discriminatory or wrongful."'1 25 There, private insurers acted in accor-
dance with a workers' compensation procedure that allowed for
withholding of benefits during a review period. 126 The suit alleged that
use of the statutory review system constituted action "under color of
law" and that the withholding of benefits "deprived them of property in
violation of due process."' 27 While the action requirement was met in
Sullivan - the insurers acted with knowledge of and pursuant to the
State statute - the question remained whether the actor requirement
was met.
128
Where a regulated industry is involved, there must be "a suffi-
ciently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the
regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as
that of the State itself."' 29 This depends on whether "the State has
exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encourage-
ment, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to
121. Id. at 939.
122. Id. (citing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345 (1974); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Flagg Bros.,
Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978)).
123. Id. at 940-42.
124. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
125. Id. at 50 (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982)).
126. Id. at 44-47.
127. Id. at 47-48.
128. Id. at 50 ("In this case, while it may fairly be said that private insurers act 'with
the knowledge of and pursuant to' the state statute, thus satisfying the first requirement,
respondents still must satisfy the second, whether the allegedly unconstitutional conduct is
fairly attributable to the State.").
129. Id. at 52.
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be that of the State."130 The private insurers in Sullivan were deemed
to have been acting according to their own judgments, authorized by
the State but not required, and without reference to standards estab-
lished by the State.131 The Court rejected the idea that authorization
or encouragement by a state could create the "sufficiently close nexus"
required:1 32 This would make any private use of state created legal
remedy or structure a state action. 1
33
Additionally, there may be circumstances where a state dele-
gates to private parties a "traditionally exclusive government
function."1 34 For example, in West v. Atkins,135 medical care to in-
mates delegated to private parties was deemed state action because
"the State was constitutionally obligated to provide medical treatment
to injured inmates."1 36 The Court in Sullivan. distinguished West by
stating that nothing in the Pennsylvania constitution or laws "obli-
gate[d] the State to provide either medical treatment or workers'
compensation benefits to injured workers."1 37 The Court thus relied on
the idea that insurance is not a "traditional" state function, as before
the workers' compensation statutes, insurance of the type in question
was purely a private enterprise, as was the determination by an in-
surer that a claim was one for which it was liable.138
Thus, the private insurers, under two separate tests, were not
"state actors": Their action was "not fairly attributable to the State"
and therefore, "an essential element" of § 1983 was not satisfied.
39
The Supreme Court did not address the question whether the standard
of "under color of' law was fundamentally different from that of state
action.1 40 The Court merely stated the reach of "under color of' did not
extend to "merely private conduct" "[l]ike the state action requirement
130. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "Action taken by private entities with the
mere approval or acquiescence of the State is not state action." Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 52-53.
133. Id. (citing Tulsa Profl Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988)
("Private use of state-sanctioned remedies or procedures does not rise to the level of state
action.")).
134. Id. at 55 (discussing and distinguishing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988)).
135. West, 487 U.S. 42.
136. Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 55 (citing West, 487 U.S. at 54-56).
137. Id. at 55-56.
138. Id. at 56-57.
139. Id. at 58.
140. See id. at 49-50.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment."141 There was no further analysis of
whether the "merely private conduct" for each was fundamentally the
same, or, despite having one similar limitation, the standards could
encompass different conduct. There was no development upon the dis-
tinctions in Lugar's footnote eighteen, though possibly because
Sullivan was also a due process case.
To avoid the entanglement with due process, a clarification of
the aspects of "under color of' would have to arise under a case where
the right being deprived is a statutory right, rather than a constitu-
tional one.142 A rare Supreme Court § 1983 case against a private
party, Gonzaga University v. Doe, again specifically avoids this ques-
tion,1 43 continuing the cautious approach in the court's other
examinations of this statute. Other cases in the statutory right area
are against public actors or public officials: the State of Maine,'4 a
New York sewage authority, 45 a state hospital,146 a Virginia housing
authority, 147 public educators, 148 the City of Los Angeles, 49 and the
141. Id. at 50 (emphasis added). The Court cited Blum, 457 U.S. at 1002, for the fact
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not cover mere private conduct. Sullivan, 526 U.S. at
50.
142. An interesting aside concerning actions under § 1983 to enforce statutory rights is
that certain readings of the statute could cause major interpretive Problems. Justice
Powell's dissent in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting),
exemplifies this problem. There, Justice Powell says that the "and laws" portion of § 1983
was added only in 1874 when Congress reorganized the U.S. Code and split the previous
statute into a substantive one (modern § 1983) and two jurisdiction statutes (modern 28
U.S.C. § 1343). Id. at 15-16. This was not, however, supposed to make any substantive
change. Id. at 14-15. In Justice Powell's view, "the legislative history unmistakably shows
that the variations in phrasing introduced in the 1984 revision were inadvertent." Id. at 16.
Thus, statutory rights should possibly not be part of the statute at all, excepting perhaps
equal protection statutes. See id. at 11-34. The problem this might raise is that exclusion
of "and laws" would then make it so that under current interpretation of rights under the
Constitution, the "under color of' language would become superfluous: all § 1983 actions
would require state action-excepting Thirteenth Amendment claims-thus making "under
color of" law actually mean "under law." The state action doctrine makes it so that the actor
has the countenance, and thus responsibilities of, the law. It says nothing about color and
everything about actuality, at least under the sorts of interpretations under cases like Home
Telephone. In considering whether to accept Justice Powell's characterization of history,
this change in the statute and the countenance given to the rest of the words therein should
be taken into account. A full discussion of this particular nuance, however, is outside of the
scope of this article.
143. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 277 n.1 (2002).
144. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1.
145. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
146. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
147. Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
148. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
149. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608 (1986).
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Director of the Nebraska Department of Motor Vehicles. 150 There re-
mains an open question whether the differences noted in Lugar will
actually be expounded upon in a later case. It would seem that "under
color of" law, differing from "law," would cover more conduct than what
is considered state law under the Fourteenth Amendment. This dis-
tinction becomes important when discussing this doctrine in light of
Hart's theory in The Concept of Law.
2. The Theory
This section, in applying Hart's theory to the interpretation of
the "under color of' language in § 1983, examines several questions.
First is which of the two interpretations of the statute the cases above
and the theory suggest - the guise interpretation, or the primary obli-
gation to follow secondary rules interpretation. Second, within that
question, there remains question of how to move forward, if at all, with
a standard for suits against private parties under § 1983.
The language of § 1983 itself suggests positivist theory: "under
color of' law. Legal theory attempting to answer the question, "What
is law?" is immediately implicated. For law to have a 'color' would ap-
pear to suggest, at first blush, that it must have naturalistic,
observable properties. While one should not place too much weight on
this metaphorical reading, it does suggest a meaning for the phrase as
a whole. "Under color of' suggests that certain actions can appear to
have the authority of law, while at the same time, those same actions
may not actually be law. Because the phrase does not merely say
"under law," it suggests that the statute applies to more than actions
which are consistent with the law. Hart's theory is implicated all the
more because of the way that he describes secondary rules. Rules of
recognition are what allow both experts and citizens to have access to
knowledge about what is and is not a law. In different contexts, these
might be different, accounting for the multiple types of law mentioned
in the statute: "any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age." 15' Compliance with the basic ideas of positive law theory and
secondary rules suggests that other parts of Hart's theory might corre-
spond with deeper analysis of the statute.
The next question becomes whether the Supreme Court's analy-
sis in Home Telephone and Monroe correlates with the concept of the
rule of recognition. The rule that a municipal ordinance is a law, even
if the state's highest court has not ruled on the ordinance's validity,
150. Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439 (1991).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2007).
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would seem to coincide with the idea that certain actions - here munic-
ipal actions - create recognizable law that is seen from the internal
standpoint as valid. A rule of recognition, with an ordinance like in
Home Telephone,152 would refer to the rule of legislation and the ordi-
nance books. While, as stated above, United States rules of recognition
ultimately refer to the Constitution, reference to the open texture idea
- that law is unclear as to its extent and applications, especially when
stated in general terms - shows that it is more than possible for per-
sons in the internal standpoint, as well as those making the laws, to
take the ordinance in question to be law despite the validity defect of
its unconstitutionality. Another interpretation might also be that the
rule of recognition in the United States does not require final adjudica-
tion by a court upon the permissibility of every rule in order for the
rule to be valid law. The very limitations on advisory opinions that are
central to, at least federal, courts1 53 show that this is the case.
A similar analysis applies to the rogue officer scenario, as in
Monroe. A person looking at the situation can see that the officers
used their status as law-makers in some sense to act. It was their abil-
ity to use the rule of recognition to their advantage that allowed those
officers to perform the acts that they did. The aspects of the rule of
recognition absent from their actions were only the constitutional ones.
In this way it appears that these cases support an interpretation that
§1983 covers situations where the actions taken would be within the
applicable rule of recognition but for the violation or deprivation of a
federal right.
Section 1983 does not say merely "law," but rather says, "under
color of."1 54 In cases like Monroe, it is clear that the actor and action
involved would have the aspects that would lead an observer to con-
clude that, even if the action was not "law," it had the properties that
would lead one to believe it was law. The action involved has the
"color" of law, metaphorically. In the language of Lugar, police officers
clearly have "apparent authority." The harder question, covered by
both Lugar and Sullivan and conspicuously absent in the statutory
context, is whether - and when - action by private parties can be either
state action or action "under the color of' law. The question also re-
mains whether these standards should differ under Hart's theory and
the statute.
152. See Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. L.A., 227 U.S. 278, 280 (1913) ("The appellant.., sued
the city and certain of its officials to prevent the putting into effect of a city ordinance
establishing telephone rates . .. ").
153. See Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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There is nothing in the statute itself that suggests that "under
color of' is limited to only state actors. As footnote eighteen in Lugar
indicates, it is the requirements for constitutional right deprivation
that create the state actor requirement. 155 State action is not a re-
quirement of the "under color of' element. Thus, in the statutory
context, it may be possible for "merely private actors" to be liable under
§ 1983, so long as their actions have the aspects that would make it
appear to an observer that those actions carried the force of law.
This interpretation of "under color of' corresponds more closely
with the interpretation that the statute is a primary rule that refers to
secondary rules in prohibiting certain harms done under the guise of
secondary rules. The reason the other interpretation, the statute as a
primary rule that requires officials to follow certain secondary rules
when they act, does not work within the statute is, simply put, that the
statute is not written that way. Even beyond the "under color of' lan-
guage, the statute speaks of not depriving rights, rather than following
certain rules. It is relatively clear that it is not meant to create liabil-
ity for just any unconstitutional state action.
Having concluded here that the best interpretation of § 1983 is
as a primary rule that creates liability for depriving rights in the guise
of secondary rules, we must then determine the standards for deter-
mining "guise." The question becomes from what perspective "under
color of' will be examined, from what perspective "apparent authority"
must be apparent. Logically, one may either examine it from a judi-
cial, post-hoc perspective or from a citizen's in-the-moment
perspective.
The distinction between these two perspectives is best ex-
plained through comparison of two examples. For the first example,
imagine a citizen is the victim of a good con artist. The con artist is
equipped with all of the indicia of a police officer: badge, equipment,
uniform, car, radio, etc. This con artist manages to deprive the citizen,
in the course of the intricate con, of a federal statutory right, or per-
haps a constitutional right without a state-actor requirement.156
The citizen is tricked. Perhaps she voluntarily permits the con-
man to enter her home. Consent eliminates any normal tort claims the
citizen might have. 157 One might say that there is a certain additional
155. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 935 n.18.
156. The right to travel, for example, can be violated by private parties. It is not
unlikely that such a right might be violated in such a situation as my hypothetical.
157. Cf Bumper v. N.C., 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 394 (1971). An exception to this
proposition might be the common law tort of fraud, however.
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harm visited when an action is made by the state or when an action
violates constitutional rights. 158 Over all, the citizen is harmed in a
unique way when that harm comes under the guise of a state actor,
even if that actor is not actually related in any way to the state.
The citizen will see this con-man as acting under color of law
from the in-the-moment perspective. Even if taken from a reasonable
person perspective rather than a subjective one, the con-man appears
to be acting with the authority of the state. However, from a post-hoc
perspective, a judge might look at the situation differently. In retro-
spect, a judge may be able to look at the actual events and surrounding
circumstances to determine that there were not the required indicia of
law for the con-man to be acting under color of law - the uniform and
equipment did not come from the right sources; there was no law giv-
ing any amount of authority to the con-man, so that the apparent
authority doctrine would not support finding authority there. There
was not actually any law involved, other than the fact that other situa-
tions like it had laws involved. This makes it so that from the post-hoc
perspective the con-man would likely not be acting "under color of' law.
This example shows that under the post-hoc standard the general in-
terpretive framework of § 1983 as enjoining a special type of harm is
not possible.
For the second example, imagine a situation not entirely unlike
Lugar - a corporation which happens to have extensive contacts with
the state and which acts under a statutory scheme deprives a citizen of
a statutory right. The citizen in the moment may have no idea that the
corporation is so entwined with the state as to give its action the au-
thority and corresponding restrictions of the state. Yet, still, the
corporation manages to harm the citizen by depriving some statutory
right.
Under this second example, the citizen has neither an in-the-
moment experience of the color of law, nor any in-the-moment experi-
ence of apparent state authority. In a post-hoc judicial setting,
however, a judge may well, as they often now do under the state action
doctrine, find that the corporation's actions have enough of the indicia
of actual law to qualify as having the color of law.' 5 9 The "fairly attrib-
utable" language in Lugar and especially Sullivan suggest a post-hoc
analysis for the state action doctrine.
160
158. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394-95; id. at 408-09 (Harlan, J. concurring) ("the type of
harm which officials can inflict when they invade protected zones of an individual's life are
different form the types of harm private citizens inflict on one another").
159. See, e.g.,.Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 50; Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941-42.
160. See, e.g., Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 50; Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
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This example shows that under the in-the-moment standard,
situations that currently fall under the imprimatur of § 1983 might
not. This "might," however, could be considered unlikely to arise.
Under the Court's state action doctrine tests, most of the actions that
would be taken as state action are so in part because the citizens in-
volved recognize the actions taken as state action. The tests discussed
in Lugar and Sullivan - the traditional governmental functions test,
the nexus test, and the joint action test 161 - show this. Under the
traditional functions test, an in-the-moment citizen would likely as-
sume that the government is performing the function that has
traditionally been exclusive to it. Under the nexus test, when the pri-
vate actor has a sufficiently close nexus with the government, that
nexus is likely considered sufficiently close because the private action
is such that it could be easily confused with state action. Under the
joint action test, the state and the private party are acting in concert,
and therefore a citizen in the moment would likely identify the private
actor as a state actor. The problem with the in-the-moment standard
is that it has the possibility of foreclosing liability for actions that fall
under these categories. Under each test, it would be possible for a
"state action" to be not "under color of' law, the same incongruity that
made the City of Chicago's arguments incorrect in Monroe v. Pape.162
In this way an in-the-moment standard may not be acceptable to the
Court because, when applied to constitutional cases, it might not come
to the same results.
These two examples show that under the in-the-moment per-
spective standard, § 1983 would essentially enjoin certain types of
harm subjectively experienced by a citizen, while under the post-hoc
perspective, § 1983 would essentially enjoin deprivation of certain
rights only if there is enough actual legal support for the legal process
to pick out some state authority. Both viewpoints have problems. The
post-hoc perspective moves toward eliminating definitional difference
between "law" and "under color of law;" the in-the-moment perspective
could create situations where the Court's current state action method-
ology would find "law" where "color of law" is not present. It is unclear,
based on the statute itself or the theory, which of these two standards
is more appropriate. Thus, it may be the Court must perform a policy
analysis to determine which to apply, or find form some variety of com-
promise: The very fact that eventually Hart's theory gives out in the
clarification of this law in part is supported by Hart's theory: The open
161. See Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 57; Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939.
162. See discussion supra in text accompanying note 114.
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texture of the law makes it so that eventually courts have to engage in
some moral or policy examination. 1
63
Possible compromises might, however, be able to encompass
both of these standards. For example, a totality of the circumstances
test using each standard as a factor would fully take into account the
fact that both perspectives exist and that there are multiple vantages
from which to view the "color of' law. In the end, a compromise test
could incorporate the theoretical and practical strengths of both tests,
effectively providing a test that aligns with the decisions already ren-
dered by the Court and with the various ways in which the internal
point of view and rules of recognition work for both citizens and offi-
cials. This compromise position could in fact be suggested by one of the
constraints on inclusive legal positivism: the internal accuracy con-
straint. Hart's theory accounts for the internal points of view of both
citizens and officials, and therefore an identification of the law that
accounts for both points of view would be more closely aligned with
Hart's nuanced view of the nature of law.
B. Municipalities as Persons and the Actions Attributable to Them
Section 1983 also requires that a "person" deprive the plaintiff
of rights.164 This raises two major questions: whether "person" defini-
tionally includes municipalities, and how to distinguish action of
individual officials from action of the municipality.
1. The Cases
In the beginning of § 1983 jurisprudence, Monroe v. Pape16 5
held that the City of Chicago was not a "person" within the meaning of
§ 1983.166 In Monroe, the officers involved were held personally liable,
but the city that employed them was not liable at all. The Court based
its reasoning largely on the legislative history of § 1983, specifically an
amendment to the Act that did not pass: the Sherman Amendment. 67
The Sherman Amendment would have extended liability to municipali-
ties for the acts of private parties who rioted and by their acts
destroyed property or injured people.' 68 The Court interpreted com-
163. See HART, supra note 2, at 128.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
165. Monroe, 365 U.S. 187; see supra Part IV.A.
166. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.
167. See id. at 188.
168. See id. at 187-88 nn.38, 41; Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663, 749 (1871).
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ments made by certain Representatives 169  regarding the
unconstitutionality of the Sherman Amendment to mean that the
House believed that any liability extended to municipalities under the
Civil Rights Act would have been unconstitutional.
170
Sixteen years later, Monell v. Department of Social Services171
overruled this part of Monroe.172 In Monell, the New York City De-
partment of Social Services had an official policy compelling pregnant
employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before they would have
been required for medical reasons. 173 After reexamining the historical
record, the Court reinterpreted the statements relied on in Monroe to
refer to the obligation to keep the peace, rather than equating "obliga-
tion" with "civil liability."' 74 Because of this distinction, the debates on
the Sherman Amendment were taken to be inapplicable to the inter-
pretation of § 1 of the Civil Rights Bill, now § 1983.175
The Court continued on to explain, "An examination of the de-
bate on § 1 and application of appropriate rules of construction show
unequivocally that § 1 was intended to cover legal as well as natural
persons." 76 Municipalities could "through their official acts . . . ,
equally with natural persons, create the harms intended to be reme-
died by § 1, and, further, since Congress intended § 1 to be broadly
construed, there is no reason to suppose that municipal corporations
would have been excluded from the sweep of § 1."17 7 This absolute lan-
guage ignores Justice Douglas's concern in Monroe and later cases
about the financial ruin of municipalities, 1 78 which provided the public
policy counterpoint to the "harm" argument presented in this quote.
While the arguments are convincing that for most other constitutional
and statutory purposes, "person" applies to corporations and natural
169. "[Tlhe House had solemnly decided that in their judgment Congress had no
constitutional power to impose any obligation upon county and town organizations, the
mere instrumentality for the administration of state law." Statement of Rep. Poland, Cong.
Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at 804.
170. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191 ("The response of the Congress to the proposal to make
municipalities liable for certain actions being brought within federal purview by the Act of
April 20, 1871, was so antagonistic that we cannot believe that the word 'person' was used
in this particular Act to include them.").
171. Monell, 436 U.S. 658.
172. Id. at 663.
173. Id. at 660-61.
174. Id. at 665, 669-83.
175. Id. at 683.
176. Id. at 683.
177. Id. at 685-86.
178. Id. at 664 n.9.
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persons alike, 179 the overall reasoning of the Court still does not rest
on anything stronger than a balance of public policies.
The question remained, however, what the standard for holding
municipalities liable would be. The Courts in Monroe and Monell
agreed that respondeat superior would be an inappropriate method by
which to impose liability on municipalities whose employees act tor-
tiously. °80 The Monell standard, stated broadly, was when the act
alleged in the suit "implements or executes a policy statement, ordi-
nance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by
that body's officers"18 1 as well as when such act is according to "govern-
mental 'custom.' '1 8 2 Another statement of the standard was, "II]t is
when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by
its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an
entity is responsible under § 1983."183 This standard is based in part
on the "shall subject, or shall cause to be subjected" language in
§ 1983.184 The municipality must in some way "cause" the deprivation
of a right, which must be enacted specifically though an individual
official.185
Over all, the discussion in Monell answered many questions,
but left open how to recognize when a municipality has a policy or cus-
tom such that the act of an individual official can be attributed to the
larger unit. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati18 6 began to answer how the
Court would go about recognizing municipal policy or custom when
presented with the actions of municipal officials. In Pembaur, the act
was the forceful entry into Pembaur's office building to serve arrest
warrants for two of Pembaur's employees.18 7 The reason this unconsti-
tutional entry was able to be linked to the City was that the sheriffs
called the County Prosecutor for advice and were instructed to "go in
and get them."188 Never before, however, had the prosecutors or the
sheriffs been confronted with a situation where they had to forcefully
enter, and never before had the City expressed any official position on
179. " See id. at 687.
180. See id. at 663 n.7.
181. Id. at 690
182. Id. at 691.
183. Id. at 694.
184. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
185. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692.
186. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
187. See id. at 472.
188. Id. at 473; id. at 492 (Powell, J., dissenting).
121
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW
such entries.'8 9 The question then became whether the act and the
order from the prosecutors could be deemed "official policy" in order to
be a basis for liability under Monell.190
The Court held that the order from the prosecutors did create a
policy, even though it was an isolated incident. 19' The rule used to
determine this was the contentious part of Pembaur. Justice Bren-
nan's plurality opinion presented one possible rule, while Justice
Powell's dissent offered another. Justice Brennan's test is based on
state law: whether the decision-maker has the discretion and authority
to make final policy on the topic at hand, 92 or stated differently, where
"a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among
various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establish-
ing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question."' 93 For
Justice Brennan, this test was satisfied in Pembaur because an Ohio
statute authorized sheriffs to consult prosecutors on ambiguities, and
that the "County Prosecutor could establish county policy.'
94
Justice Powell characterized the majority's test as "focus[ing]
almost exclusively on the status of the decisionmaker."' 95 This relied
on state law, and ignored any possible federal test for what constitutes
"making policy.' 96 Justice Powell's proposed test instead focused on
two factors: "(i) the nature of the decision reached or the action taken,
and (ii) the process by which the decision was reached or the action
was taken." 97 This test carried with it a judgment about what 'official
policy' is: "Focusing on the nature of the decision distinguishes be-
tween policies and mere ad hoc decisions. Such a focus also reflects the
fact that most policies embody a rule of general applicability." 98 Even
after proposing a test based on rules of general applicability, Justice
Powell continued to mention the situation in Owen v. City of Indepen-
dence, where a process was followed by the proper authorities to enact
a rule that was not generally applicable. 99 Over all, Justice Powell
189. Id. at 474.
190. See id. at 477-84.
191. See id. at 476-77.
192. See id. at 481-83.
193. Id. at 483-84.
194. Id. at 484.
195. Id. at 498 (Powell, J., dissenting).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 499.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 500 (citing Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980)). In Owen the
city council denied the sheriff a name-clearing hearing after disparaging him at a council
meeting. This action in itself involved in no way a general rule, but rather was a finite,
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focused on a narrow interpretation of the idea of a municipal policy,
and would have established some type of uniform process requirement
for the establishment of policy. 200
This battle arose again in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik.20 1 The
act in question in Praprotik was the transfer of a city architect to dead-
end jobs and his eventual termination.20 2 In rendering the decision,
Justice O'Connor attempted to clarify the Pembaur rule;20 3 Justice
Brennan, concurring in the judgment, fought against the new defini-
tion of municipal action proposed by the plurality. 20 4 Both agreed that
the city was not liable, but they did not agree upon how that conclusion
was reached. There was no disagreement that the identification of the
policy-making rule was a question of state law.20 5 What followed from
this distinction is where the dispute arose.
Justice O'Connor went further with the statement that the
identification of authority was a question of state law, saying also that
it "is not a question of federal law, and it is not a question of fact in the
usual sense."20 6 In determining the persons responsible for the termi-
nation and whether it was city policy, Justice O'Connor placed great
weight on the state statutes involved and the aspects of city govern-
ance at the highest levels, specifically identifying who the
policymakers should have been.20 7 Because neither the Mayor and Al-
dermen nor the body established to review employment decisions
established a policy, Justice O'Connor did not find a policy.
individual act by the council. Overall, as will be discussed below, Justice Powell's dissent in
Pembaur ignores that "mere ad hoc decisions" can be law as equally as general rules.
200. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 492-502 (Powell, J., dissenting).
201. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988).
202. See id. at 114-16.
203. See id. at 123 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor restated the
Pembaur test: "First .... municipalities may be held liable under § 1983 only for acts which
the municipality itself is actually responsible, 'that is, acts which the municipality itself has
officially sanctioned or ordered.' Second, only those municipal officials who have 'final
policymaking authority' may by their actions subject the government to § 1983 liability.
Third, whether a particular official has 'final policymaking authority' is a question of state
law. Fourth, the challenged action must have been taken pursuant to a policy adopted by
the official or officials responsible under state law for making policy in that area of the city's
business." Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480, 482-83 & n.12).
204. Id. at 132 (Brennan, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 124 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
206. Id.
207. See id. at 124-32; see, e.g., id. at 128 ("The Mayor and Aldermen enacted no
ordinance designed to retaliate against respondent or against similarly situated
employees.").
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Justice Brennan,20 because he did not support determining
municipal liability in a "formulaic and unrealistic fashion," saw state
statutory law as the "appropriate starting point" to determine the "ac-
tual power structure" in a municipality. 20 9 He noted, "We in no way
slight the dignity of municipalities by recognizing that in not a few of
them real and apparent authority may diverge, and that in still others
state statutory law will simply fail to disclose where authority ulti-
mately rests."210 This admission that when he wrote the words "state
law" in Pembaur he did not mean exclusively statutory law is an im-
portant clarification that the plurality opinion by Justice O'Connor
glosses over. While these two opinions do not offer significant changes
to Pembaur, they show that there are still clarifications possible in the
concepts and definitions used when analyzing municipal liability.
These tests offered by the Court in the § 1983 context are not
the only possible tests, however. In a completely different context in
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,211 the Court instead
used an "actual notice" standard to determine the liability of a school
district for sexual harassment by an employee teacher. 212 Rather than
using a statutorily based remedy, the Court implied a right of action
from Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.213 The lower
courts in Gebser reasoned that the statute "was enacted to counter pol-
icies of discrimination ... in federally funded education programs," and
that "[o]nly if school administrators have some type of notice of the
gender discrimination and fail to respond in good faith can the discrim-
ination be interpreted as a policy of the school district."214 The
Supreme Court agreed, stating the scheme under the statute, which
removes federal funding from schools with discriminatory policies "is
predicated upon notice to an 'appropriate person' and an opportunity to
rectify any violation."
215
208. Justice Brennan, who authored the Pembaur decision similarly reiterated the
Pembaur holding: "[It is] appropriate to hold municipalities liable for isolated constitutional
injury inflicted by an executive final municipal policymaker, even though the decision
giving rise to the injury is not intended to govern future situations ...as long as the
contested decision is made in an area over which the official ... could establish a final policy
capable of governing future municipal conduct ...." Id. at 140 (Brennan, J., concurring).
209. Id. at 143, 145.
210. Id. at 143.
211. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
212. Id. at 278-79, 285, 290.
213. Id. at 280-84 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.).
214. Id. at 279 (quoting District Court, Western District of Texas).
215. Id. at 290.
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Gebser could, however, supply alternative reasoning for a mu-
nicipal liability standard under § 1983: A municipality would be liable
if the appropriate people knew about the deprivation of rights and did
not stop it. This standard is unlikely to be applied, and unlikely to
work within the statute, however. First, it would create liability in
same way the Sherman Amendment 216 would have, the same way that
the Court in both Monroe and Monell determined would be an uncon-
stitutional use of Congressional power. It would require a
municipality to act affirmatively any time it discovered unconstitu-
tional action by an official, and thereby essentially impose a cost on the
municipality merely through its amount of knowledge. Second, the
Gebser standard does not account for causation language in the statute
- that liability flows only from depriving a citizen of or causing the
deprivation of rights, obligations, or privileges under the Constitution
and law of the United States.217 This reason to reject this standard is
more in line with a Hartian recognition of how rule-making and action
within the ambit of power-conferring rules work.
Yet, even a knowledge standard might be justifiable under the
language of the statute because of the presence of the classification as
law of a state "custom." 21 8 Knowledge of a practice that deprives citi-
zens of their rights without corrective action could be seen as a tacit
acceptance of that practice. In this way, the Gebser standard might be
appropriate, but only for certain categories of "law" listed in § 1983. As
will be shown below, Hart's theory provides a framework to incorporate
this other use of the Gebser standard into a more generally applicable
one.
2. The Theory
The two questions in this section are first whether Hart's theory
provides independent support for the application of the term "person"
to municipalities and second, if municipalities are persons, what stan-
dard applies to determine when a municipality is acting for purposes of
§ 1983. The first question is essentially a definitional problem. The
definition of "person" in the statute is determined either by the terms
of the statute itself or by the rules of recognition in the jurisdiction
enacting the statute, namely the federal government. Thus, however
216. See supra notes 185-205 and accompanying text.
217. Notice the standard under Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290, is not the same as causation,
which is the statutory standard under § 1983. Compare id., with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2007).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
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the Supreme Court determines "person" applies would be valid within
Hart's theory.
As a sub-question, one might ask if the definition of person were
subject to determination based on how each state created municipali-
ties. If so, the question would then be how the state creates entities,
and therefore be a question of identification rather than definition.
Luckily, these are already incorporated in the question the Supreme
Court asks in determining personhood of artificial entities, even if they
are not determinative of the definition of person itself. The Supreme
Court in some sense identifies municipalities based on how they are
created by each state. A body may be an arm of the state and thereby
not a person, or may be a municipal corporation and a person, depend-
ing on the specifics of the power conferring rules that create the
particular entity. Because Hart's theory accounts for nuance in the
delegation of authority,219 these relationships do not pose a problem for
Hart, even if his theory does not specifically provide a standard by
which to determine the status of a body as a person.
The second question, what standard to apply once it is deter-
mined that municipalities are persons, is more clearly a question of
identification of law. Rather than being a definitional problem, this is
a problem of identification of municipal action when it occurs. Identifi-
cation of municipal action is necessary to determine whether the action
itself falls under the language of § 1983 - whether the municipality
deprived or caused the deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity.
While the distinction between municipal action and individual
action under Hart's positivism makes use of the concept of rules of rec-
ognition in a similar way to the "under color of' law discussion above,
the reasoning differs significantly, and with it the result. Municipali-
ties are artificial entities, and as such, cannot act in the same way that
we would understand an individual to act. Therefore, we must first un-
derstand how municipalities act and when individual actions by
officials become the actions of the larger entity.
As with any artificial entity, action by the entity must be
through individual actors. We distinguish between actions within the
entity and actions outside of the entity easily. Distinctions become
more difficult when, as with action by municipal officials, persons prop-
erly labeled as within the entity act. This is where the rule of
legislation and rule of recognition becomes important. Hart's theory,
unlike previous theories, provides a basis for identification of power-
conferring rules as law. Those power-conferring rules delegate the au-
219. See discussion of rules of legislation supra Part III.A.1.
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thority to create new rules so long as it is done in a certain way. For
example, a county ordinance may delegate authority to act on behalf of
the county to a commissioner, but only if he acts according to certain
procedures. Additionally, the commissioner might have de facto power
to act in some situations because that power has been delegated to
him. However, the commissioner will not be creating county rules that
are seen as law when eating cereal for breakfast. Thus, we know via
the rule of legislation in a particular municipality and for a particular
type of rule, whether it be legislation or precedent of some variety.
Unlike with "under color of," this is not an analysis where ex-
amination of appearances is necessary. This is almost necessarily a
post-hoc, objective examination under the rule of recognition and rule
of legislation applicable to the municipality in question and the specific
actors and actions involved. Thus, there is no need for the citizen's
perspective to be taken into account here. Any examination from the
in-the-moment perspective discussed above would not take into ac-
count the language of the statute - the question here is not whether
there was the "color of' municipal action, but rather is whether the
municipality caused the deprivation in question, whether the depriva-
tion is "fairly attributable" to it.
This is also not a respondeat superior type of claim,220 though to
a cynic it may appear so in certain situations where the municipal offi-
cial involved makes all rules in the form of precedent and without
accompanying statements that make the content of the rule clear. The
difference is that under the local law that governs the official's action,
a judge will be able to identify, via the applicable rule of recognition,
whether the pertinent rules of legislation were followed.
This reasoning seems to be more like Justice Brennan's plural-
ity opinion in Pembaur221 and concurrence in Praprotnik,22 and less
like Justice Powell's dissent in Pembaur,223 the plurality decision in
Praprotnik,224 or the alternative standard from Gebser.225 Justice
Brennan comes as close as the Supreme Court has to using the princi-
ples in The Concept of Law. In Pembaur, Justice Brennan turned to
220. Strict vicarious liability of an organization for the acts of an officer or employee,
which the doctrine of respondeat superior tends to exemplify, by definition does not contain
an element of fault on the part of the superior or organization. Cf BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY
(8th ed. 2004), definition of strict liability; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004),
definition of respondeat superior.
221. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 471-85 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
222. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 132-47 (Brennan, J., concurring).
223. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 492-502 (Powell, J., dissenting).
224. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 114-32 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
225. Gebser, 524 U.S. 274; see supra text accompanying notes 231-35.
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state law to find the rule of legislation and rule of recognition applica-
ble to the situation, and he then determined whether those rules were
actually followed. It just so happens that in Pembaur, the rule of legis-
lation created a precedent-type rule, rather than a legislation-type
rule. In Praprotnik, he steps slightly closer when he recognizes that
the state and local law involved may be de facto law - rules followed in
practice rather than those statements most easily discernable from the
outside in the form that other communities might make rules. Justice
Brennan's recognition that the rule of recognition in certain communi-
ties may differ to the point that the Supreme Court's reliance on
statutes and formally adopted measures may be misplaced lies
squarely within the principles present in Hart's theory.
Justice Powell's dissent in Pembaur attempts to identify munic-
ipal action with a sort of "one size fits all" federal standard, naming all
laws as rules of general applicability. 226 This does not fit with the
nuanced idea of law that Hart develops, specifically with the idea that
creation of primary rules and official action can occur in a wide variety
of ways - the spectrum between legislation and precedent. Another
interpretation of Justice Powell's proposed test, since he relies on
Owen v. City of Independence is that municipal action must merely be
in a form easily recognizable by the Court as via official processes;
however, this again ignores the variety of ways in which a municipality
might act. Over all, use of a general federal standard for identifying
what rules of legislation are present and used in a municipality ignores
the nuance in the identification of law - Justice Powell's test would
ignore the variety in rules of legislation, too heavily depending on a
removed-perspective rule of recognition.
The plurality opinion in Praprotnik takes a similar tack to Jus-
tice Powell, though under the guise of identification of state law. The
plurality test, because of its focus only on state statutes and the munic-
ipal charter, ignores the various ways that rules can be created. Just
as under Home Telephone state or municipal laws that violate the con-
stitution are still considered laws enacted by the state, so a
municipality may create rules that run contrary to the state's or its
own explicitly stated standards. 227 In terms of Hart's theory, the plu-
rality test again ignores the variety in rules of legislation, too heavily
depending on a removed-perspective rule of recognition. Between
these three tests, it is clear that Justice Brennan's test captures more
226. See supra notes 215-20 and accompanying text.
227. Cf Home Telephone, 227 U.S. at 283-84.
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of the nuance inherent in law, and the same nuance that Hart points
out in his descriptions of secondary rules.
As mentioned in the previous section, the Gebser standard does
not work for every category of law listed in § 1983.228 As such it could
be rejected outright, except for the fact that in the context at least of
municipal "custom," it continues to be informative and possibly useful.
Another advantage of Justice Brennan's test and the interpretation of
the statute in light of Hart's theory is that they can be considered to
incorporate the Gebser standard in certain contexts, whereas the other
tests do not supply any way to incorporate different methods of identi-
fying customs systematically.
V. CONCLUSION
The theoretical outline here may provide a way to move forward
with § 1983. Decisions under and interpretations of § 1983 require an
understanding of the nature of law, how law is made in different com-
munities and contexts, and how citizens understand the law. Hart's
legal positivism effectively lays out the nature of law, and in doing so,
can provide a foundation for future decisions. The Court's current
methodology lacks the fundamental theoretical underpinnings that
might provide a clarification for § 1983 doctrines. While selection of a
theoretical underpinning may open the door to arguments over natural
law against positive law, the debate in analytical jurisprudence after
Hart still contains the fundamental aspects related above. Few of the
nuances to Hart's theory are necessary for it to provide an effective
foundation here.
As seen in the discussions above, Hart's conception of the inter-
nal point of view and secondary rules can help to provide a way to move
forward with the definition of "under color of," specifically in the con-
text of private actors who deprive citizens of statutory rights or
privileges. While the theory does not give a final determination of a
test, it provides different possible standards, and possibly a compro-
mise test that incorporates both a way to move forward and a
validation of past decisions.
Additionally, Hart's nuanced look at the different ways of creat-
ing law and recognizing law can help to provide a coherent test for
determining when a municipality is acting or causing action. While
Hart's theory does not provide a method for determining the threshold
question - whether municipalities are persons - it does provide a sys-
228. See supra notes 231-39 and accompanying text.
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tematic, though necessarily complex and gestalt, way to identify
municipal law.
Unfortunately, as Hart pointed out in The Concept of Law and
as seen in this article, public policy arguments will necessarily arise
within the open texture of the law.229 The question becomes how and
when those arguments arise. The balance between two competing pub-
lic policies - enforcement of rights and limitations on societal costs of
liability - is shifting ground, able to change and turn with the Court's
feelings toward the institution of tort law in general. A foundation in
history, as seen in the switch from Monroe to Monell, can be just as
shaky: given enough history, one can find statements to support most
any proposition. Just as with speech act theory and the First Amend-
ment and other similar foundational projects in the law, this project
may supply a more stable, even if necessarily fluctuating, base for
§ 1983.
229. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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